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Abstract 
South Korea and Japan usually cooperate but occasionally experience periods of conflict that 
disrupt their relationship.  This paper seeks to explain those sporadic periods of conflict using a 
dynamic theory.  This theory posits that South Korean leadership power status coupled with 
Japanese action on sensitive issues will lead to a period of conflict.  President Kim Dae Jung’s 
administration serves as the case study for this paper.   
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Introduction 
 This thesis seeks to answer the question of why South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or 
ROK) and Japan experience periods of conflict despite various incentives for cooperation.  To be 
clear, when this author refers to periods of conflict, this does not refer to military conflict but 
rather disruptions in relations (for example, suspension of personnel exchange, backing out of 
agreements on intelligence exchange).  The sporadic periods of conflict in the normally 
cooperative relationship between South Korea and Japan present an interesting question for 
political science.  For example, in 1997 Japan decided to cancel a fishery agreement with Korea 
as a result of conflict concerning statements made by Japan’s Prime Minister regarding the 
colonial period.1 A more recent example of the disruption that arises from these periods of 
conflict occurred in 2012: South Korea and Japan delayed a meeting between their finance 
ministers2 regarding a free trade agreement because of a dispute about the Liancourt Rocks.3 
This kind of disruption contradicts expectations because South Korea and Japan have 
many incentives to cooperate.  For Korea, trade with Japan grew from approximately twenty-
nine billion US dollars in 1990 to about one-hundred and five billion in 2011.4  Common 
security concerns provide additional incentives for cooperation. Both South Korea and Japan rely 
on their alliances with the US to deter North Korea from acting on threats like those it made in 
                                                          
1
 Cheol Hee Park, “Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts: Korea–Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” Asia-
Pacific Review, 15, no. 2, (2008):22-23. 
2
“Finance ministers of Korea, Japan share need to resume FTA talks,” The Korea Times, November, 24, 2012, 
accessed April 4, 2013, www.koreatimes.co.kr 
3
 The Liancourt Rocks, called Dokdo by Korea and Takeshima by Japan, dispute refers to a dispute over ownership 
of two small islands in between South Korea and Japan.  Japan views ownership of the dispute as a territorial issue 
while Korea views it as a historical issue.  Korea has made efforts to legitimize their occupation of the rocks but 
Japan claims their occupation is illegal based on historical ownership. 
Mark J. Valencia, “Domestic Politics Fuels Northeast Asian Maritime Disputes,” East-West Center: Asia Pacific 
Issues, 43, (2000):4, accessed April 8, 2013.  
4
 Asia Regional Integration Center: Tracking Asian Integration, “Economic and Financial Indicators, South Korea 
and Japan,” Accessed April 3, 2013. www.aric.adb.org 
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2013.5  The question of why South Korea and Japan experience periods of conflict in their 
relationship greatly concerns international relations because the behavior of North Korea 
endangers both countries, and increased cooperation between South Korea and Japan, such as 
sharing of intelligence, would lead to a more secure and stable environment in East Asia. 
Broader international relations theories cannot explain these sporadic periods of conflict 
but several scholars have presented theories designed to explain why these periods of conflict 
occur.6  Victor Cha uses a quasi-alliance model to claim that the periods of conflict can be 
explained by Japan and South Korea’s perception of the security commitment of the United 
States. While Cha’s theory is useful in explaining conflict behavior, there are some periods 
which it cannot explain.7   
Hwang Jihwan presents a model focused on the colonial legacy, and argues that South 
Korea will choose to increase military spending when it experiences abandonment fears.8  
Hwang’s theory fails to explain the post-Cold War era when Japan and Korea experienced 
abandonment fears but did not choose to increase military spending.9 
Seung Ji Woo argues that US engagement, and political coalition governments determine 
the nature of the relationship between South Korea and Japan.10  He argues that if the US 
actively engages and pro-American coalitions are in power then cooperation will occur. Woo’s 
                                                          
5
 Joohee Cho, “North Korea Relocates Long-Range Missile in Latest ‘Rhetorical Threat,’ ” ABC News, April 4, 
2013. 
6
 The dynamic nature of the relationship makes it difficult for broader international relations theories to explain it.  
Park, “Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts,” 18-19. 
7
 Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and 
Korea," International Studies Quarterly, 44, no. 2 (2000): 261-291. 
8
 Jihwan Hwang, “Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power: Historical Antagonism, Internal Balancing, and the 
Korea-Japanese Security Relationship,” World Affairs, 166, no. 2 (2003): 95-96. 
9Tim Kane, "Global US troop deployment, 1950-2005," Center for Data Analysis, Report, June 2, 2006. 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003 
10
 Seung Ji Woo, “Puzzle of Korea –Japan Cooperation in the Cold War,” Korean Journal of Political Science, 37, 
no.3, (2003): 129-131. 
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theory does not explain why periods of conflict occur even when the US actively engages and 
pro-American coalitions are in power. His theory also faces problems when applied to the post-
Cold War era because Korean coalitions diverged from their pro-American stance, which led 
Woo to assume a constant pro-cooperation stance on the Korean side.11 
Yoon Tae Ryong proposes a net threat theory to explain the relationship between Japan 
and South Korea.12 He describes net threat as combination of perceived threat and forces 
mustered against the threat.  This theory asserts that the credibility of US commitment can also 
affect net threat.  If Japan’s and South Korea’s perceptions of net threat diverge they will 
experience a period of conflict. However, it is unclear how Yoon measures converging and 
diverging threat perception. 
Cheol Hee Park combines Yoon’s net threat theory, Cha’s quasi-alliance model, and 
Hwang’s theory on colonial legacy into what he describes as a convergent-management 
hypothesis.13  He considers convergent-divergent threat perceptions and the escalation-de-
escalation of historical controversies as determining the nature of the relationship between South 
Korea and Japan.  Park’s theory very accurately explains the dynamic nature of the relationship; 
unfortunately, he does not clearly define how he measures his variables. 
Overall, the existing arguments indicate the importance of historical contentions; Park’s 
treatment of historical contentions as a variable is crucial in explaining the dynamic nature of the 
relationship.  In order to explain the puzzling periods of conflict, this author argues that Japanese 
action on sensitive historical issues triggers a period of conflict if the Korean president’s power 
                                                          
11
 Gi-Wook Shin, “South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspective,” Asian Survey, 36, no. 8 (1996): 
793-794. 
12
 Tae Ryong Yoon, Fragile Cooperation: Net Threat Theory and Japan-Korea-U.S. Relations (New York: 
Columbia University, 2006). 
13
 Park, “Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts,” 14-15.  
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status is high.  This theory incorporates escalation of historical contention on both the Japanese 
side and the Korean side.  It is theoretically possible for leadership on either side to avoid 
escalating conflict.  However, this does not happen on the Japanese side as they generally trigger 
the conflict by taking action on sensitive historical issues.14   
The independent variables for this study are Japanese action on sensitive historical issues 
and the Korean president’s power status.  The Korean president’s power status is classified as 
high or low depending on the cohesion or support of his personnel network, and public sentiment 
regarding his policies.  Personnel network cohesion can be measured based on the ability of the 
president to offer incentives to support his position.  Public sentiment can be measured through 
two aspects: success of policy implementation and the president’s handling of criticism. Japanese 
action on sensitive historical issues is classified as controversial or non-controversial. 
Specifically, if the Japanese government endorses an action that is perceived as justifying 
Japanese actions during its colonization of Korea this is considered controversial. 
The dependent variable for this paper is the nature of the relationship characterized by 
periods of cooperation and periods of conflict.  Periods of conflict refers to periods of disruption 
in the relationship between Japan and South Korea.  Disruption refers to suspension of personnel 
exchange, and demands from one government for the other government to take a specific action.  
Periods of cooperation are characterized by the formation of agreements between the 
governments. 
 Kim Dae Jung’s presidential administration from 1998 to 2003 serves as the case study 
for this paper.  It provides a period of cooperation then a period of conflict followed by a return 
                                                          
14
 Park, “Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts,” 29. 
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to cooperation.  It allows for an in case comparison between the different periods of his 
administration.  The measures for the variables will be taken from accounts written about this 
period in several scholarly articles.  Although many of these articles explore topics not directly 
related to the research question, they provide valuable information about the independent and 
dependent variables for this paper.   
This paper is divided into five sections.  The first section will discuss the incentives for 
cooperation to further demonstrate the abnormality of the periods of conflict, and the importance 
of the question of why South Korea and Japan experience periods of conflict in their otherwise 
cooperative relationship.  The second section will discuss the existing arguments pertaining to 
the question and show how they guided the development of my theory.  In the third section, the 
author’s theoretical framework will be presented.  The fourth section will consist of an in case 
comparison of Kim Dae Jung’s five year administration.  The fifth section will consist of a 
concluding discussion of future implications for the author’s theory. 
Incentives for Cooperation 
The US Factor 
Both South Korea and Japan have a close relationship with the United States but the US 
would like their relationship with each other to be stronger.15  Following WWII the US set up 
bilateral security arrangements with countries in Asia to balance against the Soviet threat.  This 
‘hub and spoke’ system (The US being the hub and Japan, Korea, Taiwan and other Asian 
countries being the spokes) provides stability in the region, preventing power rivalries and 
                                                          
15
 Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment,” 262-263. 
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allowing for development of trade.16 The US cooperates with each of these nations in 
coordinating the security of the region. South Korea and Japan house bases for the US.  
However, closer cooperation between South Korea, Japan and the US would provide even 
greater security for the interests of these countries.  The so called drone coalition between the 
US, Australia, Japan and South Korea exemplifies the kind of security cooperation the US 
desires.  This system will monitor North Korea and China, and foster intelligence sharing 
between members of this “robotic” alliance.17 Although this alliance is promising it could be 
interrupted if Japan and South Korea experience a period of conflict.   
Cultural Similarities 
 South Korea and Japan share many cultural similarities.  They are both democratic 
nations.  Both countries have market economies.  They are close geographically, separated only 
by the Sea of Japan.  Their political systems are similar in that the political parties in both 
countries are essentially personnel networks of the party leaders.This close proximity supports a 
strong tourism industry for both countries.  Approximately two million tourists from Korea visit 
Japan each year18 and vice versa.  Koreans account for the largest portion of tourists who visit 
Japan each year and with few exceptions Japanese make up the largest portion of tourists who 
visit Korea.19   Their leaders regularly meet with each other several times a year.  People-to-
people exchanges totaled 4.93 million in 2011. 20 Korean popular culture is well received in 
Japan in addition to other parts of the world.  This so called ‘Korea Wave’ consists of the 
                                                          
16
 G. John Ikenberry, “American hegemony and East Asia order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58, 
no. 3, (2004): 353.  
17
 David Axe, “Drone coalition: Key to U.S. security,” Reuters, April 1, 2013. 
18Japanese National Tourism Organization, “2012 Foreign Visitors and Japanese Departures,” Accessed April 6, 
2013. http://www.jnto.go.jp/eng/ttp/sta/PDF/E2012.pdf 
19
 Korea Tourism Organization, “Korea Monthly Statistics of Tourism,” Accessed April, 6, 2013. 
http://kto.visitkorea.or.kr/eng/tourismStatics/keyFacts/KoreaMonthlyStatistics.kto;  
20
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea. “Japan.” Last updated 2011.  Accessed February 
5, 2013.  http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/main/index.jsp 
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growing popularity of Korean cultural exports including television dramas, popular music, 
movies and video games.21  As of 2008, Korea and Japan have shared 113 sister cities; 
additionally tens of thousands of Korean students study in Japan.22  In 2002, they co-hosted the 
Fifa World Cup, increasing cultural familiarity.23 
Common Security Concerns 
 South Korea and Japan share security interests in protecting themselves from China and 
North Korea.  The history between South Korea, Japan and China is complex, leading to 
complex perceptions of China on the part of Japan and Korea.  Japan and China have had 
numerous wars and competed as rivals in the region until the end of WWII.  China’s growth in 
power, both economically and militarily, gives South Korea and Japan a security-based reason to 
cooperate.  According to Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory, South Korea and Japan are 
facing a choice between balancing against and getting on the bandwagon with a rising China.24  
In addition to historical experience, the nuclear arsenal of China should encourage the non-
nuclear powers of Japan and South Korea to cooperate to a greater extent.  
North Korea presents another regional threat, which also should encourage security 
cooperation between South Korea and Japan, because it is a nuclear power and its leadership 
generally acts unpredictably. North Korea sporadically engages in long range missile tests or 
tests of nuclear weapons.  These tests greatly concern both South Korea and Japan, as they are 
the closest targets for the rogue-state regime of North Korea.  In April 2013, North Korea 
amplified and intensified its rhetoric and took actions as though it was preparing for war. These 
                                                          
21
 Lara Farrar, “Korea Wave of pop culture sweeps across Asia,” CNN, December 31, 2010. Accessed April 6, 2013.  
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/12/31/korea.entertainment/index.html?iref=NS1 
22
 Park, “Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts,” 14. 
23Fifa, “Fifa World Cup, Host Announcement Decision,” Accessed April 6, 2013. 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/mencompwc/51/97/81/ip-201_13a_fwc-host.pdf 
24
 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, 9, no.4, (1985):3-9. 
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actions included cutting lines of communication, shutting down the joint industrial complex in 
Kaesong, moving long range missiles into strategic positions, and warning other countries to 
evacuate their embassies in South Korea.25  Although most North Korean rhetoric focuses on 
anti-Americanism, it also includes South Korea and Japan in the anti-capitalist focused words.26  
North Korea possesses the technological capabilities to inflict severe civilian casualties on South 
Korea and Japan.   
North Korea considers the United States its sworn enemy; however, because an attack on 
the United States may be outside North Korea’s capabilities, it may settle for a closer target of 
South Korea or Japan.  These threats from China and North Korea provide significant incentives 
for South Korea and Japan to cooperate.  However, South Korea and Japan have implemented 
few cross military exchanges or cooperative defensive measures.  Periods of conflict between 
South Korea and Japan interrupt these cooperative efforts.  For example, in 2012 they intended 
to implement a military intelligence exchange program but it had to be suspended when protests 
broke out in South Korea regarding the program.27  Without these interruptions South Korea and 
Japan could potentially conduct joint military exercises similar to those that South Korea 
conducts with the United States.  A higher level of cooperation may allow the US to conduct 
three party military exercises with South Korea and Japan. 
Economic Integration 
In addition to security related incentives, South Korea and Japan have many economic 
incentives to cooperate and are becoming increasingly economically integrated.  Trade with 
                                                          
25
 Larisa Epatko, “Timeline and Maps: North Korea Ramps Up Rhetoric, Missile Systems,” PBS Newshour, April 5, 
2013. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/04/north-korea-timeline.html 
26
 “N. Korea says it conducted successful underground nuclear weapons test,” USA Today, October 9, 2006. 
27
 K.J. Kwon, “South Korea and Japan put military intelligence pact on hold after outcry,” June 29, 2012, accessed 
April 5, 2013.http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/29/world/asia/south-korea-japan-pact 
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South Korea makes up 6% of Japan’s total trade share percentage as of 2011.  For South Korea 
trade with Japan made up 9% of its total trade share percentage in 2011.28  According to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of South Korea, bilateral trade between South Korea and 
Japan totaled $1.08 billion in 2011.29  In addition to trade, foreign direct investment indicates 
economic integration; FDI from Japan to South Korea totaled 4.54 billion in US dollars. This 
doubled the previous year’s FDI.30  South Korea and Japan have been attempting to form a free 
trade agreement, but the talks discussing the formation of such an agreement are interrupted or 
delayed when periods of conflict arise.31   
Cooperation between South Korea and Japan provides more security in the region and is 
in the economic interests of both these countries.  It is puzzling that countries with this level of 
cultural similarity, economic integration, and these common security concerns would experience 
periods of conflict. The next section will discuss attempts to explain this phenomenon.   
Existing Arguments 
 Scholars developed several theories to specifically address the question of why South 
Korea and Japan continue to experience periods of conflict in spite of many incentives for 
cooperation.  These theories include: Victor Cha’s quasi-alliance model, Seung Ji Woo’s 
engagement-coalition politics hypothesis, Tae-Ryong Yoon’s net-threat theory, Jihwan Hwang’s 
historical antagonism argument, and Cheol Hee Park’s convergent-management hypothesis.   
                                                          
28
 Asia Regional Integration Center. 
29
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, “Japan,” last updated 2011. 
30
 “Japan’s FDI in Korea hits record high in 2012,” Yonhap News Agency, February 19, 2013. 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2013/02/19/47/0503000000AEN20130219001900320F.HTML 
31
 Park, “Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts,” 14. 
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Quasi-Alliance Model 
Victor Cha sought to answer the question of why South Korea and Japan have volatile 
relations despite shared security interests throughout the Cold War.  To do this he developed the 
quasi-alliance model.  A quasi-alliance is the relationship between two states that are not allied 
but share a great power as a common ally.  In our case, South Korea and Japan remain unallied 
but are both allies with the United States. Cha argues that South Korean and Japanese perception 
of the United States’ security commitment better explains alliance behavior than either historical 
antagonism or external threats.   
Although he recognizes that both of those factors can have an effect on the relationship 
and can be an underlying source of cooperation or conflict, he posits that fears of abandonment 
or entrapment are the key causal variables in determining the alliance behavior of quasi-allies.  
Fear of entrapment refers to fear of losing power and independence by becoming dependent on 
another power for security.  Fear of abandonment refers to the fear of being abandoned by one’s 
great power ally.  If states fear abandonment, they will show greater commitment to cooperation. 
Strengthening cooperation is the best option for states to address abandonment fears because 
internal buildup is usually prohibited by cost or culture, this prohibition led to the original 
formation of the alliance.   If states fear entrapment they will show less commitment to 
cooperation.  States will generally show a weaker commitment to the alliance to elicit a response 
from the ally by which they fear becoming entrapped.   
Cha hypothesizes that when quasi-allies experienced asymmetric abandonment or 
entrapment fears there would be greater friction in the relationship.  In turn, he also hypothesizes 
that symmetric abandonment, or entrapment fears would lead to cooperation.  He finds that 
South Korea and Japan exhibited the expected cooperation, when they feared abandonment by 
Explaining Conflicts in Japanese-South Korean Relations  Ence 11 
 
the US when it pulled out several divisions from both countries during the period from 1969-
1971.  As part of Nixon’s Guam doctrine, which stated that the US would no longer bear the 
primary defense burden of its Asian allies, the US withdrew approximately twenty thousand 
soldiers from South Korea and seven thousand from Japan.32  Cooperation was manifest in the 
1969 Korea clause and the Okinawa base agreement, which essentially committed Japanese 
territory to involvement if a second Korean war broke out. Cooperation also took place in the 
form of economic assistance to boost South Korea’s growth. 
His other hypothesis was also supported as friction increased during the 1972-1974 
period.  During this time abandonment fears diverged.  As the US pursued détente Japan’s fears 
decreased and South Korea’s remained constant. Cha’s model works well and provides a basis 
for departing from traditional theories, such as balance of threat.33  The alliance behavior of 
South Korea and Japan contradicts the balancing or bandwagon expectations from the balance of 
threat theory but can be better explained by abandonment and entrapment fears. 
Scholars criticize Cha’s model, claiming that it does not explain certain periods or 
dismisses ways to improve security other than strengthening alliances. Yoon Tae Ryong is 
concerned with the pre-normalization period and the ineffectiveness of Cha’s model at 
explaining the relationship at this time.34  During this period, from the end of WWII to 1965, the 
US applied constant pressure to encourage Japan and South Korea to normalize their relations.  
However, the relationship did not change for many years even with US pressure.  Another 
criticism focuses on Cha’s dismissal of internal military buildup as a response to abandonment 
fears.  Although Cha addresses this as a possible response, Hwang Jihwan claims that Cha 
                                                          
32
 Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment,” 273. 
33
 Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment,”263-264. 
34
 Yoon, “Learning to Cooperate,” 24-25. 
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neglects to consider the United States’ pacifying influence in preventing the remilitarization of 
these nations.  Another criticism was that Cha treats historical antagonism as constant, when in 
reality the level of historical antagonism varies depending on whether leadership chooses to 
escalate historically charged issues. 
Colonial Legacy and Internal Military Buildup  
Hwang Jihwan claims that historical antagonism can explain the nature of the relationship 
between South Korea and Japan.  He criticizes Cha’s argument saying Cha ignores increases in 
military spending as a means of increasing security when facing abandonment fears.  Facing US 
disengagement, South Korea opted to increase its military in addition to strengthening its alliance 
with Japan.  Hwang claims that how one state perceives the other is extremely important in 
determining the nature of their relationship.  Specifically, he argues that the historical 
antagonism surrounding the colonization of Korea by Japan prevents them from seeking 
alliances with each other even when they experience symmetric abandonment fears.  According 
to Hwang, this occurred in the 1970s when the US attempted to disengage from East Asia. 
Hwang claims both South Korea and Japan experienced abandonment fears, which Cha 
describes, but they chose to increase military spending in addition to strengthening their 
relationship with their quasi-allies.  In reality, South Korea and Japan pursued greater security 
through both increased military spending and strengthening their alliance with each other.35 
Hwang’s argument has two main problems: his argument does not explain the dynamic 
nature of the relationship and it cannot explain periods when both states experienced 
abandonment fears and chose to increase cooperation with their quasi-ally in addition to 
increasing military spending, such as the post-Cold War era.  Hwang includes perceptions caused 
                                                          
35
 Hwang, “Rethinking the East Asian,” 100-103. 
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by historical antagonism relating to the colonial legacy of Japan as a factor in his model. Because 
he treats historical antagonism as a constant, he cannot account for changes in the relationship 
not caused by abandonment fears.  There were periods in the post-Cold War era during which 
Japan and South Korea experienced abandonment fears but chose to both increase cooperation 
with each other and increase military spending.  Immediately following the end of the Cold War, 
South Korea and Japan became acutely aware of the probability of a US drawdown in Asia, and 
demonstrated their level of cooperation with closed door summit meetings to discuss the election 
of President Clinton in 1992.36 
Engagement-Coalition Politics Hypothesis 
Seung Ji Woo, like Cha, argues that US engagement determines the nature of the 
relationship between South Korea and Japan, but he also believes that coalition politics in both 
nations plays a large role as well.37  He argues active US engagement leads to increased 
cooperation rather than leading to decreased cooperation as Cha argues.   
Woo argues that the US is capable of inducing cooperation between South Korea and 
Japan.  The two independent variables for Woo’s argument are US engagement and coalition 
politics.  The two coalitions Woo considered important for this question were anti-communist 
conservative forces, described as an Alpha coalition, and centrist forces, described as a Beta 
coalition.  According to Woo, both South Korea and Japan have Alpha and Beta coalitions.  The 
Alpha coalition supported a strong alliance with the US while the Beta coalition argued for a 
balance between the US alliance and alliances with Japan’s neighboring countries.  Woo argues 
that when these coalitions mismatch and the US passively engages, friction between the two 
                                                          
36
 Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment,” 284. 
37
 Woo, “Puzzle of Korea,” 129-130. 
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countries increases.  In contrast, when the pro-American Alpha coalitions hold power in both 
countries, and when the US actively engages them, then cooperation will increase between South 
Korea and Japan.38 
Although Woo’s engagement-coalition hypothesis takes into account important factors in 
the relationship between South Korea and Japan, there are a few flaws in his argument.  Woo’s 
assertion that the US can discourage conflict between its allies through influence and 
encouragement is flawed.  Logically the US would seek to completely prevent its allies from 
quarreling; the periods of conflict between South Korea and Japan demonstrate the flaw in 
Woo’s assumptions about US influence.  It is possible that the US presence prevents South 
Korea and Japan from escalating their disputes to a higher level. However, if Woo’s hypothesis 
is correct then the conflicts between South Korea and Japan would be prevented by US 
influence.  Instead of actively discouraging conflicts, the US generally remains neutral with 
regard to historical disputes or disputes relating to the Liancourt Rocks.39 There are also times 
when the US actively engages, and both countries have Alpha coalitions but periods of conflict 
still occur.  For example, in 2012 a period of conflict relating to the Liancourt Rocks occurred 
even though both Korea’s President Lee and Japanese Prime Minister Noda both belong to Alpha 
coalitions and the US actively engaged.40 
Park points out that Woo’s assumption that South Korea’s coalition is always pro-
cooperation is problematic.41  In the post-Cold War period, the nature of the coalitions in both 
countries changed dramatically.  The Alpha coalitions, which held power for decades during the 
                                                          
38
 Woo, “Puzzle of Korea,” 133. 
39
 “U.S. ‘Uncomfortable’ on Japan Korea Dokdo Spat,” New American Media, August 26, 2012, accessed April 5, 
2013. http://newamericamedia.org/2012/08/us-uncomfortable-on-japan-korea-dokdo-spat.php 
40
 Kwon, “Military Intelligence Pact,” 2012. 
41Park, “Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts,”16-17. 
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Cold War, began to lose elections in the post-Cold War era.42 When historical tensions are high, 
South Korea is frequently just as uncooperative as Japan.  For example, when controversy over 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine43 arose, Korean lawmakers of 
both Alpha and Beta coalitions demanded apologies and submitted bills designed to bring more 
attention to Japanese wartime activities.44  
Net Threat Theory 
 Yoon Tae-Ryong seeks to answer the question of why South Korea and Japan experience 
periods of conflict by combining Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory45 with Glenn Snyder’s 
theory of alliance politics.46  He develops a theory called Net Threat Theory.  Net threat is 
composed of not only common threats, but also takes into account perceptions of those threats, 
the parties’ abilities to respond to that threat, and the credibility of US defense commitment. If 
either party perceives the US commitment as unreliable net threat would increase.  He 
hypothesizes that when perceptions of net threat converge the incentives for cooperation also 
increase. Conversely when perceptions of net threat diverge, incentives for cooperation decrease.  
He includes conflicting interests as a factor that could explain periods of conflict that occur 
despite high net threat and incentives for cooperation. Conflicting interests primarily refers to 
historical animosity related to Japan’s colonization of Korea.47  
 Yoon’s focus on threat provides a more direct application of balance of threat theory to 
the relationship between South Korea and Japan but fails to explain its dynamic nature.  His 
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theory would be much more useful if the variables were more clearly defined.  It is unclear how 
he determines whether the parties’ threat perceptions are converging or diverging.  The variable, 
conflicting interests, also presents a problem because it focuses on historical animosity as an 
explanation of periods of conflict.  Yoon does not clarify how he measures conflicting interests 
or how historical animosity, a constant, can explain the irregular periods of conflict. 
Convergent-Management Hypothesis 
 Cheol Hee Park attempts to incorporate Yoon’s Net Threat theory, Hwang’s emphasis on 
colonial legacy, and Cha’s Quasi-alliance model in order to develop a dynamic theory that 
adequately explains the relationship between South Korea and Japan.  He describes his argument 
as a convergent-management hypothesis.  Like Yoon, Park considers converging or diverging 
threat perceptions as extremely important in determining the nature of the relationship between 
South Korea and Japan.  He also incorporates historical antagonism as a factor.  However, rather 
than treating historical antagonism as a constant or underlying source of conflict, Park treats 
historical antagonism as a variable that can be escalated and deescalated by political leadership’s 
management of issues related to historical antagonism.   Park argues that historical contention 
can be manipulated in an expansive manner or a curtailing fashion.  The interaction of these 
variables determines the level of cooperation or conflict in the relationship between South Korea 
and Japan.  Table 1 shows the four possible results from the interaction of historical contention 
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Table 1: Relationship between historical contention and threat perception 
 
 Park also incorporates Cha’s emphasis on US management of their alliances.  He 
includes US alliance management as an intervening variable. Park argues that if the US manages 
its alliances with South Korea and Japan in an asymmetric way it will lead to conflict between 
them.  If the US engages one party more than the other, it would be considered asymmetric 
alliance management.  Table 2 shows the effect Park believes US alliance management has on 
conflict between South Korea and Japan.  
Table 2: Engagement styles and results 
 
 Park focuses on the post-Cold War era for his case studies.  He finds support for his 
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specify how he measures his variables.48 Park’s theory is fairly useful in explaining the dynamic 
nature of the relationship between South Korea and Japan; however, there are a few issues with 
his argument.  Park specifies his variables but he does not specify how he measured each of 
those variables.  This in turn makes it difficult to determine how those variables interact.  During 
the period of President Kim Dae Jung’s administration it is unclear how Park determines when 
the states’ threat perceptions are converging or diverging or even when the states perceived 
North Korea as a theat.  
Park’s theory lacks an explanation as to why political leadership in both Korea and Japan 
would handle historical contention in a way that leads to periods of conflict.  There are serious 
consequences for escalating historical controversy.  For example, periods of conflict have 
disrupted talks on the formation of a free trade agreement, and personnel exchange.49  It is 
unclear why political leadership would choose to escalate historical controversy and thereby 
cause periods of conflict to occur.  Park’s theory is useful in that it attempts to explain the 
dynamic nature of the relationship, but the lack of clarity as to how the variables are measured 
reduces its value.   
 After reviewing the cases discussed by Park, it appears that each period of conflict was 
associated with disputes relating to Japanese wartime activities, or in Park’s terms, escalation of 
historical controversy.  Park pointed out that most disputes originated on the Japanese side and 
also that Korea overreacted.50  
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Theoretical framework 
 This paper seeks to answer the question of why South Korea and Japan experience 
periods of conflict despite incentives for cooperation, through testing the theory that the South 
Korean president’s power status, coupled with Japanese action on sensitive historical issues 
determines the nature of the relationship between South Korea and Japan.  This theory focuses 
on escalation of historical controversy as the cause of conflict.  Presidential power status is 
related to Woo’s theory, and both independent variables are related to Park’s theory.  Woo 
includes coalition politics as a factor in his study, but he emphasized US influence as the primary 
factor in determining the nature of the relationship.51  Similarly, Park includes escalation of 
historical controversy as an independent variable but places more weight on convergence and 
divergence of threat perception, and also includes US engagement as an intervening variable.52   
For this paper’s question, the independent variables are South Korean president’s power 
status and Japanese action on sensitive issues.  The dependent variable in this paper is the nature 
of the relationship characterized by periods of conflict and periods of cooperation between South 
Korea and Japan.  The interaction of the independent variables has the potential to trigger a 
period of conflict in the relationship between South Korea and Japan.   
Independent variables 
South Korean President’s Power Status  
 The South Korean president’s power status is a combination of many factors but for this 
study we will measure it based on support of personnel network and public sentiment regarding 
his policies.  South Korean presidents derive a large portion of their power from the support of 
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their personnel network.  South Korean political parties differ from political parties in other parts 
of the world in that they are not solely ideologically based.53  Parties operate as entourages for 
powerful politicians, who entice legislators to support them not based on ideology but rather on 
allocation of incentives to aid the legislators’ careers.54  For example, Korean politicians have a 
tendency to receive nearly all of the votes in their home region but receive very few votes in their 
opponent’s home region because of expectations that the politician will allocate spending to their 
home district.  Studies on Korean politics refer to this tendency as regionalism.  If a politician 
receives endorsement from a political party they can benefit from the party’s home region 
advantage and receive fiscal support for campaigning in swing vote areas.55  
They keep the support of their personnel network through providing various incentives to 
people who supported them in the presidential election and to those who support them in the 
legislature. These incentives take place in the form of appointments to posts in the government, 
party endorsement, and pork-barrel spending in the supporters’ home province. The South 
Korean president has significant power in determining the national budget and uses this power to 
entice additional legislators into his personnel network.   The support of the president’s 
personnel network can be measured in terms of the president’s ability to provide incentives, and 
legislator’s roll call votes. 56 
The other part of power status is public sentiment which will be measured based on the 
president’s success in implementing his policies (success meaning the policy achieves what it 
was intended to do) and his handling of criticism. If the president handles negative public 
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sentiment regarding his policies in a way that still allows him to maintain the cohesion of his 
personnel network then his power status will be considered high.   
Japanese Action on Sensitive Issues 
 Japanese action on sensitive issues can be defined as the extent to which Japanese 
leadership takes public actions on historically charged issues.  Historically charged issues are 
those issues relating to Japanese wartime activities.  Issues that usually cause conflict are 
comfort women, Japanese history textbooks, and visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. 57 Japanese action 
on sensitive issues can be classified as controversial or non-controversial.  When a leader makes 
statements that can be construed as justifying Japanese wartime activities, this is an example of 
controversial Japanese action on sensitive issues.  When a Japanese leader takes a passive 
position on a sensitive issue this is an example of non-controversial action on a sensitive issue.  
Additionally, lack of action on sensitive issues will be classified as non-controversial action.58 
Dependent variable 
Nature of the relationship 
Period of Conflict 
 Period of conflict can be defined as the extent to which South Korea-Japanese relations 
exhibit the characteristic of disruption.  Disruption can be measured by looking for suspension of 
personnel exchanges, suspension of negotiations, such as those relating to a bilateral free trade 
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agreement between South Korea and Japan, and by demands of one government for specific 
action by leadership of another country. 
Period of Cooperation 
Period of cooperation can be defined as the extent to which South Korea-Japanese 
relation exhibits the characteristic of collaboration.  Specifically, periods of cooperation will be 
characterized by agreements between the governments, setting up and participating in joint 
ventures.  The New Fisheries Agreement in 1998 is an example of collaboration.59 
Hypothesis 
The interaction of these two variables leads to periods of conflict in the relationship 
between South Korea and Japan.  High Korean presidential power status will not immediately 
lead to a period of conflict; nor will Japanese action on a sensitive issue immediately lead to a 
period of conflict.  It is the interaction of these variables that causes the dependent variable to 
change from a period of cooperation to a period of conflict.  Table 3 shows the interaction of 
these variables. 
Table 3: Relationship between power status and action on sensitive historical issues 
 Action on Sensitive Issues 
Power Status 
 Controversial Non-controversial 
High Conflict Cooperation 
Low Cooperation Cooperation 
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Case Study 
 The case study for this paper consists of the five year term of President Kim Dae Jung 
from 1998 to 2003.  This in case comparison is useful because leadership in South Korea and 
Japan changed little during this period.60  South Korean presidents serve five year terms.  A 
period of five years may seem like a short time, however, as Park observed, even a South Korean 
President who begins with a positive attitude toward Japan can change his attitude several times 
during his administration.61  It is important to note that this case was selected from the post-Cold 
War era, since presidents previous to this period were characteristically authoritarian.  An 
authoritarian regime from the Cold War era would have to spend less effort maintaining power 
status than the democratically elected administrations of the post-Cold War era.  Kim Dae Jung’s 
administration is also a useful case because it is was not the first administration in the post-Cold 
War era.  The ten year period between the first democratically elected president and Kim Dae 
Jung’s time in office gave the Korean people time to acclimatize to rule under a democratically 
elected president.  This period gave time for Korea to develop a relationship with Japan which 
reflected the influence of the domestic populations of both countries.  This included the 
development of strong opinions on issues such as Japanese wartime activities and how the South 
Korean government should respond to Japanese action on those issues. 
This case is useful because of the strong highs and lows in the relationship between South 
Korea and Japan.  Kim Dae Jung’s administration started off with an extremely positive 
relationship with Japan, as demonstrated by the “New Korea—Japan Partnership Co-
Declaration,” but deteriorated to the point of the Korean National Assembly unanimously 
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adopting a resolution requesting that Japan revise certain passages in one of their textbooks. The 
fact that relations improved soon thereafter also demonstrates the value of this case.  Within a 
five-year period the relationship experienced a period of cooperation, a period of conflict and 
then returned to a period of cooperation.  From the beginning of Kim Dae Jung’s administration 
in February 1998 to January 2001 a period of cooperation occurred.  From January 2001 to 
October 2001 a period of conflict occurred.  From October 2001 to the end of Kim Dae Jung’s 
administration in 2003 the relationship between South Korea and Japan returned to a period of 
cooperation.   
 Kim Dae Jung’s administration shares many similarities with other Korean 
administrations and has no unique features that would make it unrepresentative for our study.  
Similar to other Korean presidents, Kim Dae Jung began with good relations toward Japan but 
experienced deterioration in that relationship later during his presidency.  One might consider 
Kim Dae Jung unique in that he was the first president to be elected as an opposition party 
candidate. 62 However, in Korean coalition politics candidates frequently change parties, and 
parties may exist for only a short time before merging with another party.63  This makes his 
election from the opposition party less relevant to our study.  
Period of Cooperation: February 1998 to January 2001 
 Kim Dae Jung entered office in February 1998; he had many goals when he came to 
power. These goals included taking measures to allow the Korean economy to recover from the 
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Asian financial crisis, and improving relations with Korea’s neighbors, specifically Japan and 
North Korea.  It is important to note that he was elected with a plurality of 40 % of the vote 
because he formed a coalition with Kim Jong Pil and a highly conservative party, the United 
Liberal Democrats.64  Even with this partnership Kim Dae Jung’s coalition did not have a 
majority in the National Assembly. He attempted to entice additional legislators to support him 
but failed to gain enough support to appoint Kim Jong Pil as prime minister, which he had 
promised to do if elected. The financial crisis also put restraints on Kim Dae Jung’s ability to 
provide incentives for his supporters. 65    These restraints on Kim Dae Jung’s ability to provide 
promised incentives to his supporters contributed to lessened support in his personnel network 
and indicate that his power status was low at this time.  The lack of support in his personnel 
network is further demonstrated by the failure to pass a majority of the 100 reform measures 
proposed during Kim Dae Jung’s first six months as president.66 
 During this period the Japanese side was characterized by non-action, but on one 
occasion they took non-controversial action on a sensitive issue.  In April 1998, Japanese 
leadership responded to efforts to raise funds for comfort women in a non-controversial way.67  
During this time South Korea’s leadership sought to raise funds to pay living expenses of former 
comfort women, now in their seventies and eighties.  Despite efforts from Kim Dae Jung, the 
Japanese government refused to contribute to these efforts, or make an apology as requested.  
The Japanese government responded by stating they had settled all legal obligations with other 
nations in an agreement after the war ended. 68 This refusal to contribute to the fund or extend an 
apology for the Japanese Army’s role in organizing comfort women brothels could have 
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triggered a period of conflict with South Korea.69  However, because the response was non-
controversial it did not lead to a period of conflict.  If the response had been controversial, for 
example, if it denied the Japanese government’s involvement in organizing the brothels or 
explicitly denied the possibility of future compensation for the comfort women then it would 
have led to a period of conflict. 
 Despite restraints Kim Dae Jung took cautious steps toward his goals.  He began his 
administration by engaging Japan in various ways, seeking to build a future-oriented 
relationship.  Under his leadership, South Korea and Japan concluded the New Fisheries 
Agreement which established a fishing zone shared between the two countries.  This was 
significant because a previous agreement was interrupted in the past because of controversy 
surrounding the disputed Liancourt Rocks.  The agreement specifically avoided establishing 
ownership of the Liancourt Rocks due to the controversy surrounding that issue.70     
 Another significant advance in South Korea-Japan relations occurred in October 1998 in 
the form of the “New Korea—Japan Partnership Co-Declaration.”  Under this declaration, made 
by leadership from both countries, South Korea and Japan agreed to pursue a future oriented 
relationship through various activities.  Prime Minister Obuchi made a sincere and heartfelt 
apology for Japan’s wartime activities as the leaders discussed this agreement.  The areas for 
future cooperation included: promotion of a deeper understanding of history, promotion of 
universal principles of freedom, democracy and the market economy, regular review of 
cooperation with the Minsters of Foreign Affairs as the supervisors of the partnership, expansion 
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of personnel exchange, expansion of defense exchanges, policy towards North Korea, and 
resolution of global issues.71  
 There were also other indicators of a high level of cooperation between them.  During 
this early period of Kim Dae Jung’s administration South Korea and Japan were able to 
reestablish research on the formation of a bilateral free trade agreement between the two 
countries.  This led to a joint study that lasted until 2000.  This spirit of cooperation continued as 
South Korea and Japan co-participation in the ASEAN+3 meetings which focused on resolving 
the Asian financial crisis. 
 These economic and political agreements indicate the dependent variable was a period of 
cooperation.  The restraints on Kim Dae Jung’s ability to provide the incentives he promised to 
his personnel network contributed to low cohesion in his party and coalition as well as decreased 
support from his personnel network. The lack of support in Kim Dae Jung’s personnel network 
indicates the presidential power status was low during this period.  The only Japanese action on 
sensitive issues during this period was non-controversial because it did not deny Japanese 
involvement in the comfort women issue but merely said that the issue had been resolved with 
previous agreements. 
Period of Conflict: January 2001 to October 2001 
 In January 2000 Kim Dae Jung renamed his party the Millennium Democratic Party and 
with this change of name announced his engagement plan with North Korea.72  This move was 
made in anticipation of the coming parliamentary elections in April.  The economy was 
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beginning to recover, removing some of the restraints that prevented Kim Dae Jung from 
providing promised incentives to his supporters.73 Kim Dae Jung took advantage of the 
parliamentary elections by providing funding for his supporter’s campaigns, endorsing 
supporters to give them a regional party advantage, and promising appointments to government 
and government-owned business positions in order to entice new legislators to support him.74 
Specifically, Nemoto found that regions which were hotly contested received more subsidies 
when the president’s party was a minority, as it is in our case.75 The ability to offer aid to 
supporters in the parliamentary election indicates a high level of support in the president’s 
personnel network and therefore high presidential power status.   
 Kim Dae Jung began to take measures to advance his policy of engagement with North 
Korea.  Specifically, he sought to hold a North-South Summit with North Korea.  He announced 
the agreement to hold the summit shortly before parliamentary elections in April 2000.  Despite 
this announcement, and his efforts to entice more legislators into his personnel network, his party 
was unable to obtain a majority in the National Assembly.  Even without the majority in the 
legislature Kim Dae Jung was able to accomplish his goal of a summit with North Korea in June 
2000 by relying on the support of his personnel network.76  The level of support in Kim Dae 
Jung’s personnel network at this time indicates high presidential power status.   
 As Kim Dae Jung increased the cohesion in his personnel network criticism from the 
conservative coalition also increased.  Specifically, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
                                                          
73
 By this time the Korean economy was bouncing back and many of the measures implemented by the OECD were 
being revised. 
John West, “Kim Dae-jung: A tribute,” OECD Observer, accessed April 6, 2013. 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3080/Kim_Dae-jung:_A_tribute.html 
74
 Nemoto, “Committing to the Party,”234, 277. 
75
 Nemoto, “Committing to the Party," 301. 
76
 Kim, Lee, “Desecuritization of North Korea,” 43. 
Explaining Conflicts in Japanese-South Korean Relations  Ence 29 
 
focused on ending corruption, cronyism and regionalism in the South Korean government made 
various accusations against members of Kim Dae Jung’s coalition.  The NGO, the PSPD or 
Human Society for Participatory Democracy, released a list of supposedly corrupt politicians, on 
this list was Kim Dae Jung’s coalition partner Kim Jong Pil.77  Kim Dae Jung’s sons were also 
accused of accepting illegal campaign contributions.  Despite these criticisms Kim Dae Jung 
maintained the support of his personnel network and held the summit.   
 However, criticism following the summit indicated that the cohesion of his alliance and 
personnel network faced challenges.  He returned from the summit making several 
announcements about agreements reached therein.  He obtained funding for a joint tourism 
venture of Mount Kumsang in North Korea and the establishment of a joint industrial complex in 
Kaesong.78  Kim Dae Jung’s success in holding the inter-Korean summit was met by heavy 
criticism from parts of the conservative coalition, and from Kim Dae Jung’s coalition partner 
Kim Jong Pil.  This criticism focused on lack of reciprocity from North Korea.  The meeting 
between Kim Dae Jung and President Bush gave this criticism more weight when Bush 
expressed similar concerns and his desire for a way to be sure of North Korean disarmament.79   
 The high level of criticism peaked in late 2000 and early 2001; the Ministry of National 
Defense in Korea released a white paper stating that they considered North Korea as much of a 
threat as they had before the inter-Korean summit in June 2000.80  Public opinion on Kim Dae 
Jung’s engagement policy with North Korea was divided for South Koreans.  Although his 
engagement policy was positively accepted by seventy-one percent of the population, 
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approximately fifty percent felt that the government was giving too much for nothing, and sixty-
four percent wanted the government to slow down the engagement process.81 A sharp drop in the 
perception of North Korea as a cooperative partner occurred between summer 2000 and January 
2001.82  Despite the opposition from conservative forces Kim Dae Jung’s personnel network 
remained intact.  The fact that Kim Dae Jung was able to maintain his personnel network 
cohesion despite criticism from the opposition indicates that his power status was high at this 
time. 
 Early in 2001 the Japanese Ministry of Education announced that a new history textbook 
would likely pass the textbook review process.83  The textbook was created by a group in Japan 
that sought to prevent history from being taught in a way that portrayed Japan as a country to be 
hated.84 Koreans perceived this history textbook was right wing leaning, and believed that it 
portrayed the colonization of Korea in a more positive light than acceptable. Approval of a 
textbook that softened the portrayal of Japanese wartime activities is classified as controversial 
because it was interpreted as a move to depart from the Japanese constitution, inspire greater 
nationalism, and isolate Japan from its neighbors.85  The independent variable is controversial 
action on sensitive historical issues.  This controversial action coupled with Kim Dae Jung’s high 
power status led to period of conflict in the relationship between South Korea and Japan. 
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 President Kim responded by recalling Korea’s ambassador to Japan and urging Japan to 
reevaluate its review of the textbook.  When Japan did not take any action regarding the 
textbook, the Korean government asked for specific revision of thirty-five passages in the 
disputed textbook.  This time the Japanese government denied the request for revision.86  In 
addition to the demands for revision, the Korean government also suspended discussions to 
increase cultural exchange, and discouraged private groups from participating in bilateral 
exchange events like soccer matches.87 Eventually the Korean National Assembly adopted a 
unanimous resolution requesting revision of the disputed history textbook.  The textbook was 
published without the requested revision.  The disruption in their relationship also caused the 
suspension of military exchanges between Japan and South Korea.88  
 Continuing the period of conflict Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni 
Shrine in August 2001.  This action was met with various protests in Korea and Japan.  Visiting 
the shrine is controversial because it is interpreted as paying homage to Japanese war criminals 
responsible for the atrocities by Japanese forces committed during WWII.  Members of Korea’s 
National Assembly responded with demands for an apology and introduced bills designed to 
bring to light Japanese wartime atrocities.89  The recall of the Korean ambassador and the various 
demands made by the National Assembly of Korea indicate disruption in the relationship, and 
that this was a period of conflict.90   
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 Kim Dae Jung’s ability to support his personnel network in the parliamentary elections 
and his ability to maintain personnel network cohesion despite criticism indicate his power status 
was high during this period.  Both the support of the history textbook and Koizumi’s visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine indicate that Japanese action on sensitive historical issues was controversial 
during this period.  The suspension of military exchanges, the discouragement of bilateral 
exchange programs, and the demands from the Korean government indicate this was a period of 
conflict. 
Period of Cooperation October 2001 to February 2003 
 South Korean and Japanese relations returned to a period of cooperation in October 2001.  
In September 2001 Kim Dae Jung’s personnel network lost much of its cohesion, due to a vote of 
no confidence conducted against Lim Dong Won, the architect of the “Sunshine Policy,” by the 
National Assembly.  North Korea voiced its support of Lim Dong Won on the eve of the vote.  
Kim Jong Pil, Kim Dae Jung’s coalition partner, perceived this as a North Korean effort to try to 
influence South Korea policy decisions and left the coalition with Kim Dae Jung to rejoin the 
Grand National Party and the conservative coalition.  Because of the nature of Korean coalition 
politics Kim Jong Pil took his ULD party with him.  This led to the collapse of Kim Dae Jung’s 
cabinet and reduced his power status to a low level as his personnel network no longer had 
cohesion.  Kim Dae Jung continued to try to advance his policy but found little success without 
the legitimacy of his coalition and support from the legislature.  He essentially entered an early 
lame duck period following the collapse of his cabinet.91    
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 Japanese leadership took action on the sensitive issue of Japanese rearmament on October 
29, 2001 but because Kim Dae Jung’s power status was low this did not lead to a period of 
conflict. On October 29, 2001, the Japanese Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures 
bill, so that they could support the US military in Operation Enduring Freedom.92  This action 
can be classified as controversial because it marked a departure from the previously solely self-
defense force. Despite this action on this sensitive issue, a period of conflict did not occur.  The 
period of cooperation continued because of the low power status of Kim Dae Jung resulting from 
his lack of personnel network support or cohesion.   
 The dependent variable can be seen in the period of cooperation evidenced in the various 
forms of collaboration during this period.  The return to cooperation took place in a few ways.  
The fact the textbook was not widely adopted decreased tension between South Korea and Japan, 
and the period of conflict eventually gave way to the normal relationship characterized by 
cooperation.93  The textbook dispute led to the establishment of a joint history research 
committee in October 2001.  This committee was formed in hope of avoiding future disputes of 
this nature. 
 The period of cooperation continued in the co-hosting of the 2002 World Cup.  This 
event led to strong sentiments of cooperation because of the support the population of each 
country gave the other’s team at games that took place in their country.94  Cooperation continued 
following this event through the end of Kim Dae Jung’s administration in 2003. 
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Conclusion 
 Despite incentives for cooperation South Korea and Japan experience periods of conflict 
in their relationship.  There are many explanations as to why these periods of conflict occur.  
However, the strong relation of these periods of conflicts to the escalation of historical 
controversy made it prudent to test for a relationship between them.  The sporadic occurrence of 
these periods of conflict made it necessary to examine what made historical controversy become 
prominent enough to cause disruption in the otherwise cooperative relationship between Japan 
and South Korea.  This led to the hypothesis that high power status of the Korean president 
coupled with Japanese action on sensitive historical issues leads to periods of conflict.  The 
hypothesis was supported by this in-case comparison.  When the Japanese Ministry of Education 
approved the controversial history textbook in 2001 Kim Dae Jung’s administration responded 
with a hardline approach.  This was because Kim Dae Jung had to maintain his personnel 
network support.  However, when Japanese leadership approved expansion of their defense force 
and when Kim Dae Jung’s power status was low, following the collapse of his personnel 
network, a period of conflict did not occur.   
It would be prudent to test the theory from this paper against other case studies.  Future 
studies in this area should develop a method to control for other plausible causes of periods of 
conflict.  Such studies should specifically test for variables suggested by other theories that 
sought to answer this question.    This theory should be applied to other Korean administrations 
to further test the findings of this paper.  Although the sensitive historical issues brought up 
during Kim Dae Jung’s administration only included comfort women, visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine, and history textbooks, it would be prudent for future studies in this area to observe other 
sensitive issues specifically the island disputes regarding the Takeshima Rocks. 
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This theory should also be expanded to test countries with similar sporadic periods of 
conflict.  Although it is likely the countries would need to have similar historical controversy for 
action on sensitive issues to interact with the high power status of the other country.  In more 
generalizable terms, a former aggressor state’s actions on sensitive historical issues interacting 
with the power status of the former “victim state” should be considered as a contributing factor 
to periods of conflict. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Relationship between historical contention and threat perception95 
 
Table 2: Engagement styles and results96 
 
Table 3: Relationship between power status and action on sensitive historical issues 
 Action on Sensitive Issues 
Power Status 
 Controversial Non-controversial 
High Conflict Cooperation 
Low Cooperation Cooperation 
                                                          
95
 Park, “Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts,” 20. 
96










by sporadic conflict 
Longstanding friction 
 Symmetric Asymmetric 
Engagement Containing conflict Amplifying conflict 
Disengagement Magnifying conflict Protracting conflict 
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